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Humanists are gearing up to have a conversation about digital researchmeth-
ods that will be interesting for many reasons — not least, because it’s oddly be-
lated. Algorithmic mining of large electronic databases has been quietly central
to the humanities for two decades.We call this practice “search,” but “search” is a
deceptivelymodest name for a complex technology that has come to play an evi-
dentiary role in scholarship.Many of the features that seem new to us about data
mining (its “bigness” or quantitative character, for instance) have been invisibly
naturalized in our disciplines since humanists started using full-text search in
the s. Although data mining is widely framed as a novel technology now
being imported to the humanities, I’ll argue that it is better understood as a
philosophical discourse that can help humanists think more rigorously and de-
liberately about existing practices of algorithmic research.
First, what does it mean to say that search plays an “evidentiary role in schol-
arship”? e appearance of paradox here is partly produced by the word search
itself, which blurs boundaries betweendistinct technologies. Bibliographic search
can be little more than an aid to memory — for instance, if a scholar is recov-
ering the call number for a known title. Full-text search looks similar: we may
even enter search terms in the same box where we would have entered a title.
But the underlying technology, and its scholarly applications, are diﬀerent.
In practice, a full-text search is oen a Boolean fishing expedition for a set
of documents that may or may not exist. For instance, if I suspect that blushes
are symbols of moral consciousness in nineteenth-century poetry, I can go to
a database of primary sources and search for poems that contain both blush
and conscious. If I find enough examples, I flesh out an article. If not, I usually
keep trying until I succeed. Perhaps blush and shame would work better? Here
search is not just a finding aid; it’s analogous to experiment — although, to be
sure, there’s something a bit dubious about experiments that get repeated until
they produce a desired result. e search terms I have chosen encode a tacit
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hypothesis about the literary significance of a symbol, and I feelmy hypothesis is
confirmed when I get enough hits. It’s possible that the article I finally write will
discuss only a few of these sources, because I may not believe that the problem
requires “big data.” But in fact I’ve used algorithms to explore a big dataset, and
the search process may well have shaped my way of framing the subject, or my
intuitions about the representativeness of sources.
e internalmathematics of full-text search also havemore in commonwith
data mining than with bibliographic retrieval. If I do a title search for Moby-
Dick, the results are easy to scan. But in full-text search, there are oen toomany
matches for the user to see them all. Instead, the algorithm has to sort them ac-
cording to some measure of relevance. Relevance metrics are oen mathemati-
cally complex; researchers don’t generally know which metric they’re using; in
the case of web search, the metric may be proprietary.
In short, full-text search is not a finding aid analogous to a card catalog. It’s a
name for a large family of algorithms that humanists have been using for several
decades to test hypotheses and sort documents by relevance to their hypothesis.
Simple forms of full-text search were already available in the s (LEXIS was
an early example), but CD-ROM databases of historical sources weren’t widely
distributed until the s. Even today, the technology may not have perme-
ated the discipline of history as deeply as it has literary studies, since historians
rely more heavily on unpublished sources. One recent study suggests, however,
that humanists across a range of disciplines rely heavily on search engines, and
use them for research in ways that are not very diﬀerent from the general pub-
lic. (Like everyone else, we begin with Google.) e scholarly consequences of
search practices are diﬃcult to assess, since scholars tend to suppress description
of their own discovery process in published work. But as someone who began
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a dissertation just before full-text databases became available, I remember that
I seemed to be finishing it in a diﬀerent world.
emost obvious eﬀect of the new technology was that, like many other lit-
erary scholars in the s, I found myself writing about a wider range of primary
sources. But I suspect that the questions scholars posed also changed to exploit
the aﬀordances of full-text search. Before , narrowly-defined themes were
diﬃcult to mine: there was no Library of Congress subject heading for “descrip-
tions of work as ‘energy’ in British Romantic-era writing.” Full-text searchmade
that kind of topic ridiculously easy to explore. If you could associate a theme
with a set of verbal tics, you could suddenly turn up dozens of citations not
mentioned in existing scholarship, and discover something that was easy to call
“a discourse.” I remember feeling uneasy about this. e rules of the research
game seemed to have changed in a way that made it impossible to lose. Aer all,
howmany sources do you need to establish the importance of a theme? Twenty?
When searches were limited by networks of previous citations, that was amean-
ingfully high bar. But in a database containing millions of sentences, full-text
search can turn up twenty examples of anything. Even at the time, it was clear
that this might strengthen confirmation bias.
In hindsight, I underestimated the scope of the problem. It’s true that full-
text search can confirm almost any thesis you bring to it, but that may not be its
most dangerous feature. e deeper problem is that by sorting sources in order
of relevance to your query, it also tends to filter out all the alternative theses you
didn’t bring. Search is a form of data mining, but a strangely focused form that
only shows you what you already know to expect. is limitation would be a
problem in any domain, but it’s particularly acute in historical research, since
other periods don’t always organize their knowledge in ways we find intuitive.
Our guesses about search termsmaywell project contemporary associations and
occlude unfamiliar patterns of thought.
Humanists didn’t spend a lot of time debating this problem in the s, be-
cause search engines were usually our onlymode of access to large digital collec-
tions. But in recent years, research practices have diversified, and the hermeneu-

tic limitations of search are becoming obvious. In computer science, the sub-
fields of data mining and machine learning have specialized in the problem of
extracting knowledge from large collections. ey’ve come up with a range of
alternatives to search based on a more self-conscious, philosophically rigorous
account of interpretation.
I realize that last sentencemay be an eye-opener. Humanists tend to think of
computer science as an instrumental rather than philosophical discourse. e
term “data mining” makes it easy to envision the field as a collection of min-
ing “tools.” But that’s not an accurate picture. e underlying language of much
data mining — Bayesian statistics — is a way of reasoning about interpretation
that can help us approach large collections in a more principled way. In partic-
ular, it emphasizes a hermeneutic spiral that will be familiar to humanists, ac-
knowledging that we approach every question with some previous assumptions
(called “prior probabilities”), as well as particular kinds of uncertainty. When
we encounter new evidence, our interpretation is at once shaped by existing as-
sumptions, and (possibly) capable of reshaping them.is hermeneutic cycle is
intuitive enough when we’re talking about a single text; the task of data mining
is to explain how it can work at the level of a collection too large to be surveyed
by a single reader. All mapping strategies are going to make some assumptions
about the patterns we expect to find. But some strategies are also able to reveal
evidence that challenges prior assumptions.
For instance, literary scholars’ habit of using keyword search to probe for
intersections of themes (like blush/shame or work/energy) is tacitly based on a
assumption that the co-occurrence of words will reveal a connection between
their meanings. is assumption is related to a model of meaning that linguists
call the “distributional hypothesis,” which postulates that the meaning of a word
 For a brief history of data mining see Frans Coenen, “Data Mining: Past, Present, and Future,”
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is related to its distribution across contexts. is may not be a perfect model,
but it has proven to be a useful one in computer science as well as literary study,
and if we want to continue using it as a heuristic, there are more flexible ways to
use it than iteratively guessing particular pairs of words. Algorithms based on
distributional assumptions canmap the language that was in practice associated
with any term in a given period. For instance, the word most commonly asso-
ciated with blush in a collection of , eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
volumes turns out to be not shame but artless—a detail that might interestingly
complicate a scholar’s assumptions aboutmoral consciousness, if they use an ex-
ploratory strategy flexible enough to reveal it. Mapping strategies like this won’t
replace keyword search for all purposes. When you already know what you’re
looking for, a search engine is the appropriate tool. But in historical scholarship,
there are times when we don’t know what we’re looking for as well as we think.
In fact, perhaps it’s already hasty to assume that the topic I’m exploring can
be associated with a single word like blush. Maybe a diﬀerent term, that I can’t
begin to guess, was more important in this period, or maybe the social phe-
nomena relevant to my question take shape at the intersection of many diﬀerent
terms. If we want a more open-ended strategy, we can map the print record by
allowing an algorithm to organize the language of a collection into clusters of
terms that tend to occur in the same contexts. is strategy (known as “topic
modeling”) is capable of revealing discursive patterns that the researcher didn’t
necessarily go looking for.
 Magnus Sahlgren, “e Distributional Hypothesis,” Rivista di Linguistica  (): -.
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 “Topicmodeling” is a name for a large family of algorithms, but the algorithmmost commonly
used by humanists is Latent Dirichlet Allocation. For an accessible humanistic introduction, see
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Figure : Occurrences of laugh, laughter, etc. in a collection of , volumes
of poetry, divided by the topic each occurrence was assigned to. Among 
topics, I have plotted the three where laugh- occurs most oen; each topic is
labeled with its most frequent words.
Because topic modeling allows a word to belong to more than one “topic,”
it can reveal patterns of association that shi across time. Figure , for instance,
plots occurrences of laugh (andwords derived from that root) in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century poetry, dividing the occurrences by their association with
three diﬀerent algorithmically-created topics. It would be possible to consider
each topic separately — in fact, that’s how topic modeling is commonly used —
Ted Underwood, “Topic Modeling Made Just Simple Enough,”e Stone and the Shell, April ,
. http://tedunderwood.com////topic-modeling-made-just-simple-enough/. For a
more technical account, see David Blei, “Probabilistic topic models,” Communications of the
ACM, (): –.
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nineteenth-century volumes in HathiTrust Digital Library. To identify the poetry in this large
collection, I used tools for genre mapping described in Ted Underwood, Michael L. Black,
Loretta Auvil, and Boris Capitanu, “Mapping Mutable Genres in Structurally Complex Vol-
umes,”  IEEE International Conference on Big Data, pp. -.
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but here I’ve added an additional twist by showing how references to laughter
are so to speak passed from one topic to another over time. (e algorithm also
created  other topics; these only are the three where laugh- occurred most
oen.) Each topic is labeled with its most common words, giving us a sense of
the changing contexts where poets mention laughter. A contrast is visible be-
tween the public, satirical function of laughter in much eighteenth-century po-
etry, and a diﬀerent pair of contexts where laughter is associated with personal
description of a sentimental or amatory kind (“sweet,” “fair,” “eyes”). is use
of laughter for characterization is already present in the eighteenth century, but
becomes more prominent as the association of laughter with public wit fades.
I don’t mean to imply a causal connection between these changes (for one
thing, there are many other topics in the model; these three don’t constitute
a closed system). e illustration is only meant to show how topic modeling
can generate suggestive leads. But pursued in more depth, leads become results.
Matthew Jockers has used topic modeling to map nineteenth-century novels;
Robert K. Nelson has used it to correlate thematic emphases in a Civil-War-era
newspaper with the changing fortunes of the war. AndrewGoldstone and I have
used the technique to chart the rise and fall of diﬀerent critical vocabularies in
twentieth-century literary study.
Instead of dwelling specifically on topicmodeling, I want to consider theway
innovations of this kind are prompting a belated conversation about algorith-
mic exploration in general. Topic modeling will be and should be controversial
— as full-text search, actually, should have been controversial twenty years ago.
Researchers can never aﬀord to treat algorithms as black boxes that generate
mysterious authority. If we’re going to use algorithms in our research, we have
to crack them open and find out how they work. Topic modeling, fortunately,
 Matthew L. Jockers, Macroanalysis: Digital Methods and Literary History (Urbana,
). Robert K. Nelson, “Mining the Dispatch,” http://dsl.richmond.edu/dispatch/. An-
drew Goldstone and Ted Underwood, “What can Topic Models of PMLA Teach Us
About the History of Literary Scholarship?” Journal of Digital Humanities . ().
http://journalofdigitalhumanities.org/-/what-can-topic-models-of-pmla-teach-us-by-ted-
underwood-and-andrew-goldstone/ (A much-expanded version of this project is forthcoming
in New Literary History.)
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is not proprietary, like many algorithms behind web search. Topic modeling
algorithms are public, and humanists have proven to be quite capable of under-
standing them and changing them to fit humanistic goals.
To understand the interpretive limitations of an algorithm, you need to un-
derstand itsmathematical basis. For instance, in themost common formof topic
modeling, the number of topics to be produced is one of the initial assumptions
you bring to the modeling process. As a consequence, the algorithm can’t pro-
vide authoritative answers about the unity of any discourse, or about its bound-
aries. It’s always possible to model the same collection with a larger or smaller
number of topics, which would lump or split results diﬀerently. On the other
hand, the algorithm is quite good at revealing patterns of association we might
otherwise overlook.
Using algorithms for discovery raises an interesting but unfamiliar set of
philosophical questions. Humanists are still more comfortable with quantitative
methods when they can be presented in their familiar role as instruments of
verification in the late stages of research. Using an algorithm as a source of initial
leads seems perilously close to pulling a rabbit out of a hat (in spite of the fact
that we’ve been doing this with search engines for several decades). In a recent
issue of PMLA, for instance, Alan Liu wonders whether topic modelers aspire to
the goal of “tabula rasa interpretation— the initiation of interpretation through
the hypothesis-free discovery of phenomena.”
If this were true, it would create a real philosophical impasse. And one can
certainly find technophilic rhapsodies in Wired magazine suggesting that we
have reached that impasse: an endgame where “data” finally displaces all “the-
ory.” But those rhapsodies are not well informed about the statistical models
involved in data mining. It isn’t the case that topic modeling (or any other data
mining algorithm) pretends to be truly “hypothesis-free.” Amodel is an abstrac-
tion created by human beings, and computer scientists have long acknowledged
 Alan Liu, “e Meaning of the Digital Humanities,” PMLA  (): .
 Chris Anderson, “e End of eory: e Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method
Obsolete,” Wired, June , , http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/-
/pb_theory.
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this. e Bayesian probabilistic models now common in the discipline are es-
pecially meticulous about specifying initial interpretive assumptions.
A researcher who wants to fit a topic model to a collection of documents has
to start by specifying, for instance, the number of topics she expects to find, and
the degree of blurriness she expects those topics to possess. In the modeling
process, the computer doesn’t generate insights from nothing; its calculations
are rather a way of harmonizing these initial human assumptions with the com-
plex evidence presented by the documents themselves. (To use a term of art, the
computer helps us “fit” a model to the evidence.) is mode of exploration can
be more open-ended than keyword search, since assumptions about degrees of
blurriness are more flexible than a specific assumption that, say, blushes will
symbolize shame. But the interpretive process is still shaped and initiated by
human assumptions.
I haven’t had room here to make a detailed argument about the humanis-
tic value of quantitative methods. But doing that would be almost beside the
point, since humanists are already mining large datasets quantitatively every
time we use a web browser. e problem is that we are using search algorithms
we have never theorized, and arguably using them in a strongly projective way
at odds with historicism. Although the statistical language of computer science
may seem alien to our disciplinary tradition, I think the paradoxical truth is that
humanists will need to understand that language in order to design research
practices that allow us to work in large collections while remaining true to our
own hermeneutic principles.
is is admittedly a new kind of interdisciplinary conversation for human-
ists, and we may initially have a lot to learn. But we also have a lot to con-
tribute. I’ve suggested that quantitative disciplines have their own useful ver-
 “[F]undamentally, computer science is a science of abstraction — creating the right model
for thinking about a problem ...” Alfred Aho and Jeﬀ Ullman, Foundations of Computer Science
(New York, ), .
 For more examples of topic modeling, see a special issue of Poetics on “Topic Models and
the Cultural Sciences” . (). See also Lisa M. Rhody, “Topic Modeling and Figurative
Language,” Journal of Digital Humanities . (): http://journalofdigitalhumanities.org/-
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sion of hermeneutic theory, but they aren’t without blind spots. e diﬃculty
of modeling historical change, for instance, is not well understood outside the
humanities. Scientists who try to model the print record over a significant time-
span oenmake assumptions about continuity that humanists would recognize
as confining. On this topic, and many others, a rare opportunity is emerging
for a genuinely productive exchange between scientific methodology and hu-
manistic theory.
 Attempts to frame explicitly diachronic versions of topic modeling (like Dynamic Topic
Modeling and Topics Over Time) have tended to invoke dubious assumptions about histori-
cal continuity. Historians are probably better advised to rely on a simpler algorithm like La-
tent Dirichlet Allocation, which remains blissfully ignorant of dates and yet in practice tends
to produce coherent diachronic patterns. See the appendix to Benjamin M. Schmidt, “Words
Alone: Dismantling Topic Models in the Humanities,” Journal of Digital Humanities . ().
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